Stalnaker on Assertion. Intention & Acts of Meaning Seminar, Week Daniel W. Harris. April 15, 1 Why Are We Studying Stalnaker? • His model of. sometimes the content of the assertion is dependent on the context in . 'I argued in Stalnaker (a) that one can take possible worlds seriously without. Assertion · Robert C. Stalnaker. In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press. pp.
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However, it is not so clear what representing oneself amounts to.
It must be a sense different from that in which one represents the world as having certain stalnaker assertion. The speaker who asserts 22 There are black swans.
Assertion - Oxford Scholarship
By means of answering the question what I believe with an utterance of 22 I do represent myself as believing stalnaker assertion there are black swans, equivalently with asserting it.
What I stalnaker assertion then is wrong if I don't have the belief, despite the existence of black swans. By means of that, he in one sense represents himself as believing that he is in the biology department.
But the audience is no way invited to believe that the speaker, that is, the actor, has that belief.
Assertion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
That it nevertheless tracks a real phenomenon is often claimed to be shown by Moore's Paradox. Among the different types of account of Moore's Paradox, Moore's own emphasizes stalnaker assertion connection between asserting and believing.
So by asserting 24 the speaker induces a contradiction between what she asserts stalnaker assertion what she implies.
- Assertion (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
- Robert Stalnaker, Assertion - PhilPapers
- Robert Stalnaker, Assertion - PhilPapers
- Robert C. Stalnaker
This contradiction is then supposed to explain the oddity. An analogous move has stalnaker assertion made as regards knowledge-varieties of Moorean sentences, such as 25 It is raining, but I don't know that it is raining. Clearly, utterances of sentences like 25 are bad, and some think that they are as bad as the paradigmatic Moorean sentences like Linguistic arguments of this kind in general, explicitly or implicitly, have the stalnaker assertion of an inference to the best explanation.
As such, they are problematic, since there are competing explanations of the badness of Moorean utterances.
We return to this topic at end of subsection 6. A definition proposed by Dummett D-A A man makes an assertion if he says something in such a manner as deliberately to convey the stalnaker assertion of saying it with the overriding intention of saying something stalnaker assertion.
Dummett's proposal is presumably intended to give necessary as stalnaker assertion as sufficient stalnaker assertion, but there are problems with both. With the necessary conditions because of the possibility of direct expressions of belief, as urged by Williams, and with sufficiency for reasons of the same kind as discussed at the end of the previous section: Cognition Communicative intentions accounts, commitment accounts, and self-representation accounts are all descriptive: However, except for the idea that a sincere assertion is the expression of a belief that a speaker actually has, none of these types of account focuses on the cognitive features of stalnaker assertion the world and judging the representation to be true as a main characteristic.
A few more cognitively stalnaker assertion accounts do that. A judgment in turn, in Frege's view, stalnaker assertion a step from a Thought, that is, a representational content, to the acknowledgment of its truth Frege Since for Frege, the truth value is the Reference Bedeutung of a sentence, a judgment is an advance from Sense to Reference.
In case the subject makes a stalnaker assertion, it is not the actual Reference, but anyway the Reference the subject takes it to have. We can transform Frege's stalnaker assertion slightly, in the following way: Frege countenanced exactly one point of evaluation: In a sense, judging is applying a content to the World.
In this form, the idea generalizes.
Robert C. Stalnaker, Assertion - PhilPapers
If contents are possible-worlds propositions, the points of evaluation are possible worlds. All actual judgments are then applications of propositions stalnaker assertion the actual world.
If contents are temporal propositions, true or false with respect to world-time pairs, then all actual stalnaker assertion are applications to the ordered pair of the actual world and a relevant time, usually the time at which the judgment is made.
This is the point with stalnaker assertion to which a sentence, used in a context of utterance, has its truth value cf. Again, the relation is general: